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THE COURT OF JUSTICE AS A 
DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITYt 
[I/rich Ever/ing* 
"Justitia est constans et perpetua vo/untas jus suum cuique tribuendi. 
Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque in-
justi scientia. " 1 
In the European Community, the Court of Justice has the task of declar-
ing the law by means of its "cognizance of things human and divine" and 
its "knowledge of what is just and unjust," as the quoted famous words of 
the Corpus Juris Romani declare. According to Article 164 of the EEC 
Treaty, the Court is to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty the law is observed."2 That task includes not only the applica-
tion of the formal rules of the Community legal order but also the realiza-
tion of those requirements of substantive justice which alone bestow dignity 
on and legitimation to an organization responsible for human activity such 
as the Community, which has evolved beyond a mere association of states. 
The Court of Justice seeks to fulfill that task by acting in the dual capac-
ities of a constitutional court and a court providing protection of individual 
rights.3 In daily practice the task presents itself in a commonplace form, 
concealed in questions of interpretation that are technically complicated 
and directed toward specific factual situations. However, behind such nar-
row questions always lies the fundamental question of the general orienta-
tion and the system of values which are to apply in the Community. 
Eric Stein, to whom this Article is dedicated, has written a number of 
commentaries on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the basis of 
his experience with both the European continental law and the common 
law systems.4 In conformity with his pragmatic approach, the following 
examination of the Court of Justice as a decisionmaking authority devotes 
t This Article is a revised English version of the author's earlier publication, JJer 
Gerichtshof als Entscheidungsinstanz - Prohleme der Europiiischen Rechtsprechung a11s 
richterlicher Sicht, in DER EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS VERFASSUNGSGERICHT UNO 
RECHTSSCHUTZINSTANZ 137 (J. Schwarze ed. 1983). The footnotes have been supplemented, 
but most of the German references have been retained. 
• Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Co=unities. - Ed. 
1. CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN I.I (1853). 
2. Treaty establishing the European Economic Co=unity, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 164, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
3. On the Court of Justice generally, see works by its former Presidents, R. LECOURT, 
L'EUROPE DES JUGES (1976), Kutscher, Uber den Gerichtshof der Europiiischen Gemeinschoft, 
16 EuR 392 (1981), and its former Registrar, van Houtte, La Co11r de Justice des Comm11na11tes 
Europeennes, 19 CAH. DR. 3 (1983); see also G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981); H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EU• 
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3d ed. 1983); G. VANDERSANDEN & A. BARAY, C0NTENTIEUX COM· 
MUNAUTAIRE (1977). 
4. See, e.g., Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constit11tion, 75 AM. 
J. INTL. L. 1 (1981), reprinted in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 771 (1981). 
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less attention to the theoretical context than to the manner in which the 
Court attempts to accomplish its task in practice. This essay is intended to 
provide a judge's point of view, that is to say, a subjective contribution on 
the basis of personal experience gained up to the present time. Although of 
course duties of office impose limitations on such an approach, it is none-
theless possible to set down a number of conclusions. 
The first section discusses problems concerning the decisionmaking pro-
cess, in order to clarify the conditions under which the Court of Justice 
must form its opinions. There will then follow some observations on the 
manner in which the Court finds the substantive principles on which to base 
its decisions. Finally, certain conclusions regarding the appraisal of the 
case law will be drawn. 
I. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE COURT'S PROCESS 
Problems arise for the Court's decisionmaking from its composition, 
from the number and type of questions on which it must give judgment, 
and from the course of the procedure. 
A. The Composition of the Court of Justice 
Only a judicial body which has developed cohesion and an integrating 
force can be expected to produce case law that is convincing, coherent, and 
based on clear objectives. In that respect, the Court is faced with particular 
difficulties because of its size and composition. 
The full Court consists at present of eleven judges. In addition there are 
five Advocates General who also contribute to the Court's decisionmaking 
process and have a vote in administrative matters. It is obvious that discus-
sions by sixteen, or even eleven, distinctive personalities may be difficult 
and protracted. That applies in particular to the deliberations over a judg-
ment, which relate not only to its operative part but also to every detail of 
the grounds of the judgment. It is true that the Comt is able to decide by 
majority, and that does happen in practice; the usual approach, however, 
especially in cases involving fundamental issues, is to attempt to arrive at 
the widest consensus possible by a thorough discussion of all the arguments. 
Achieving broad consensus on both fundamentals and details is made 
even more difficult by the different backgrounds of the members of the 
Court. In that respect, the different professional experiences of the Judges 
in the judiciary, at the Bar, in politics, in administration and in the aca-
demic legal world would appear to be of comparatively minor significance. 
Indeed, such a wide spectrum, which is also to be found in the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), has a positive 
and stimulating effect. What is more important is that the members of the 
Court are molded by their respective home countries. They have had dif-
ferent types of education, they have different historical heritages, and they 
think in the manner of different legal systems. They thus bring to the 
Court's process of decisionmaking a variety in legal thinking as well as their 
personal concepts of values. Such variety is indispensable for the function-
ing of the Court, no matter how much more difficult its work is thereby 
made, since only if all the legal systems existing in the Community are ade-
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quately represented in the Court can its decisions have an integrative effect 
which encompasses all the Member States. 
Herein also lies the importance of having judges of a particular nation-
ality who are not "national judges" in the traditional sense. The Judge is 
not to advocate the interests of his home country. On the contrary, unwrit-
ten rules of convention impose restraint upon the Judge whose home coun-
try is particularly affected in a case. Nevertheless, each Judge has the 
important function of introducing the legal thinking and basic concepts of 
the Member State to which he belongs into the Court's consideration. Each 
Judge must also ensure that the decision and the reasoning on which it is 
based are expressed in such a way that they may be understood in his home 
country. 
The Court has mitigated the difficulties involved in plenary delibera-
tions by introducing, in addition to the already existing Chambers of three 
Judges, Chambers of five Judges. Such enlarged Chambers improve the 
variety of legal systems represented and will probably become increasingly 
important. However, assignment of a case to a Chamber must not have the 
effect of endangering the unity of the Court. The cohesion of the adjudicat-
ing bench is one of the central concerns of the Court as decisionmaking 
authority. It has so far demonstrated a remarkable integrating force, as 
each newly appointed Judge has been able to confirm. 
B. The .Diversity of Proceedings and Their Subject Matter 
A second group of problems arises from the type and number of cases 
before the Court. 
The Court delivered 185 judgments in 1982 and 151 in 1983, of which 
83 and 51 respectively were judgments of the full Court and 102 and 100 
respectively of the Chambers.5 Each Judge must therefore act as Judge-
Rapporteur in, on the average, eighteen to twenty cases annually, the diffi-
culty and importance of these cases being, of course, uneven. In addition, 
each Judge must give equally great attention to the important cases of other 
Judge-Rapporteurs. The burden of work is therefore a heavy one, and little 
time remains for reflection. 
The subject matter of cases ranges from institutional and other ques-
tions of principle, such as the institutional position of the European Parlia-
ment and the significance of fundamental and human rights, to economic 
questions relating, for example, to the law governing competition, the regu-
lation of the agricultural or steel market and the external trade, to social 
problems such as the freedom of movement for workers, social security and 
the law governing officials of the Community, and finally to the quite differ-
ent problems of the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments of 
the individual Member States. There is virtually no legal field that is not 
touched upon; many cases concern unusual and specific areas such as the 
hallmarking of precious metals, the law on foodstuffs in relation to vita-
mins, or the treatment of particular cuts of meat in the context of agricul-
tural law. Thus, the Judges are required to possess a high degree of 
5. For details, see Everling, .Die Mitgliedstaaten der EuropiJischen Gemeinschqft vor il,rem 
Gerichtshof, 18 EuR IOI (1983) (English version forthcoming in the European Law Review). 
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intellectual agility and broad legal knowledge and experience. That per-
sonal challenge constitutes a particular attraction of working at the Court, 
even though it is not always easy to fulfill the expectations of the lawyers 
who are specialists in a given field. 
So far the Court has rejected the suggestion that every Judge should act 
as Rapporteur in a special field of law, as is the case, for example, in the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. The individual Judge would then achieve such 
dominance in his specialized field as to endanger the equal contribution of 
all legal systems to the case law in every area. 
Certain types of cases place the Court of Justice in the particularly diffi-
cult position of determining facts. References for a preliminary ruling leave 
such determinations in the first place to a national court, but in direct ac-
tions the Court must determine the facts. The Court of Justice attempts to 
clarify the facts primarily by asking the parties questions, although recently 
it has heard evidence with increasing frequency.6 Because of its structure 
the Court is, of course, ill-suited to this task, even if it is carried out by one 
of the Chambers. The Court would therefore certainly be glad if this fact-
finding burden were removed from it, especially in cases involving competi-
tion law, and assigned to a court of first instance.7 
C. The Course of the Procedure 
Considerable problems for the Court's decisionmaking also arise from 
the course of the procedure. 
The Judges receive their initial introduction to a case in the preliminary 
report. This report is presented by the Judge-Rapporteur and serves as the 
basis for deciding whether to hold a preparatory inquiry and whether to 
assign the case to a Chamber.8 Neither that report nor the report for the 
hearing, which summarizes the facts and issues in preparation for the oral 
procedure, contains a provisional conclusion on the case. Thus, unlike 
most continental national courts, especially the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
the Court of Justice proceeds to the hearing without any preliminary exami-
nation or deliberation. The Court is thus deprived of the opportunity to 
link the parties' oral argument from the outset to those questions which 
seem important to it, although of late attempts have been made to do so, 
particularly in the Chambers, albeit with only limited success. It is only as 
the result of the often very penetrating questions put by the Judges and 
6. See, e.g., Musique Diffusion Fran,;aise v. Co=ission of the Eur. Co=. (Nos. 100-
103/80), (1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8880 (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. 
June 7, 1983) (pioneer judgment), digested in 1983 PROC. CT. J. EuR. COMM., No. 14/83, at 1 
(June 6-10), which contains a full assessment of the evidence. 
7. Such a step has been sought for a long time by advocates, but it is not seriously dis-
cussed today because it has not even been possible to reach agreement at the political level on 
the creation of a court of first instance to hear staff cases, although the need for this reform is 
recognized by all those acquainted with the problem. See Billow, Uber!egungen far eine 
Weiterentwick/ung des Rechts der Gemeinschqflsgerichtsbarkeit, 15 EuR 307, 315-16 (1980). 
8. See Rules of Procedure, Art. 44(1), 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 1, 12-13 (Feb. 15, 
1982). For details of the course of the procedure, see van Houtte, supra note 3; Lecourt, La 
Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes vue de /'interieur, in EuROPA["]1sCHE GERICHTS-
BARKEIT UNO NATIONALE VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT - FESTSCHRIFf ZUM 70. GEBURTS-
TAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 261 (W. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981). 
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Advocates General after the oral argument that it becomes plain where crit-
ical points lie. However, the questions do not always disclose the ques-
tioner's own inclinations in regard to the matter in point. 
The Court of Justice is also reluctant to curtail the parties' oral argu-
ment, which often strays far from the issues. The Court usually restricts 
itself to an appeal for self-discipline since, in view of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the common understanding of the law, every doubt concerning 
the proper course of the procedure and above all concerning the un-
restricted right to be heard by the Court must be eliminated. As a conse-
quence, the sittings of the Court are often unduly long. The Court will 
react strongly, however, when it has the impression that the representative 
of one of the parties is acting in a dilatory or unfair manner with regard to 
the other party in connection with the production of documents or with new 
arguments. 
After the oral procedure there is normally an interval of three to six 
weeks or, if a Court vacation occurs in the meantime, even of some months, 
before the Advocate General gives his opinion. The importance of that 
opinion has often been considered,9 and no further emphasis need be 
placed on it. From a Judge's point of view, especially one who is not the 
Judge-Rapporteur, its importance lies primarily in the fact that it consti-
tutes a further, objective presentation of the subject matter of the case. 
That advantage, however, is gained at the cost of a considerable postpone-
ment of the commencement of the deliberations, with the result that the 
impressions gained at the hearing fade. The Judges may refresh their mem-
ories by referring to the minutes of the oral proceedings, but such a process 
entails considerable extra work. 
The Advocate General's opinion which is given in full session is fol-
lowed by a preliminary deliberation of the Court to determine the general 
line of the judgment on the basis of a written or oral proposal made by the 
Judge-Rapporteur. Following up the result of this discussion, the Rap-
porteur submits a draft judgment in French, which is then considered sen-
tence by sentence. In difficult cases the deliberation may involve several 
readings and last many weeks. 
Each case therefore extends over a relatively long period of time and 
runs concurrently with others. The Judges must constantly think them-
selves anew into each case, which involves considerable cost in work and 
time. However, the process does allow opinions to be clarified gradually by 
repeated reflection and discussion and to be refined in response to each 
other. This method improves the chances to achieve wide-ranging agree-
ment. Therefore, although the course of the procedure is to some extent 
burdensome, it does nevertheless produce an integrating effect within the 
Court. 
9. See, e.g., Dashwood, The Advocate General in the Court ef Justice ef the European Com-
munities, 2 LEGAL STUD. 202 (1982); Reischl, Die Funktion der Genera!anwO/te in der Europll• 
ischen Rechtsprechung, in DER EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS VERFASSUNGSGERICHT UNO 
RECHTSSCHUTZINSTANZ 121 (J. Schwarze ed. 1983). 
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II. THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN DECISIONMAKING 
How does the Court of Justice obtain the substantive criteria for its deci-
sions? Where does it find the standards for the "scientia justi atque injusti," 
for what is, in its opinion, lawful and just in the Community? The answers 
to such questions are normally sought in the methods of interpretation em-
ployed by the Court10 and in the theory of the general principles oflaw.11 
That is certainly the correct approach and it is therefore possible to refer to 
relevant legal literature on these matters. However, in addition some obser-
vations will be made on the practical process by which the Court finds its 
rules of interpretation and its general principles of law. This will be done 
from three points of view. First, consideration will be given to the Court's 
general line of approach to the case in point, secondly to the importance of 
differences between the legal systems represented in the Court, and finally 
to the synthesis of those views on the basis of Community objectives. 
A. Method of Approach to Individual Cases 
The Court bases its decisions, as is proper for a judicial body, on specific 
cases and facts. That is obviously its position in relation to direct actions, 
although parties looking for broad decisions of principles do not always 
appreciate this sufficiently. It is also the case as regards references to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. 
In proceedings for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty, the Court is only to answer, in an abstract manner, the question 
referred to it by the national court, and the national court is to apply the 
answer to the specific case at hand. Nevertheless, the Court is in most cases 
able to give a suitable answer, one helpful to the national court, only if it is 
acquainted with the underlying factual circumstances, because only then is 
it able to assess correctly the significance of its reply. Thus in these cases, 
too, the Court repeatedly asks questions regarding the views of the parties, 
the contested national provisions, and the effects of different conceivable 
decisions. In response to an abstract question, such as the question referred 
to the Court in the Adoui case12 by a Belgian court seeking a definition of 
the concept of public policy or the question referred to it in the Zuchner 
10. See H. Kutscher, Methods oflnterpretation as Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice, 
Court of Justice of the European Co=unities, Judicial and Academic Conference (Sept. 27-
28, 1976); See also A. BREDIMAS, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNITY LAW (Eu-
ropean Studies in Law Vol. 6, 1978); Bleckmann, Zu den Auslegungsmethoden des Europiiischen 
Gerichtshofs, 35 NJW 1177 (1982). 
11. On the development of general principles of law and the methods used, see H. 
LECHELER, DER EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSHOF UNO DIE ALLGEMEINEN RECHTSGRUNDSATZE 
(1971); J. SCHWARZE, DIE BEFUGNIS ZUR ABSTRAKTION IM EUROPAISCHEN GEMEIN-
SCHAFTSRECHT 224 (1976); Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 29 (1981); Meessen, Zur Theorie 
Allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsiitze des Internationalen Rechts: .Der Nachweis Allgemeiner Rechts• 
grundsiitze des Europiiischen Gemeinschq/isrechts, 17 JAHRBUCH FUR INTL. RECHT 283 (1974); 
Pescatore, Le recours dons la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes 
a des normes deduites de la comparaison des droits des £tats membres, 35 REV. TRI. DR. COMP. 
337 (1980). 
12. Adoui v. Belgian State (Nos. 115-116/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1665 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling). 
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case13 seeking a ruling on concerted practices relating to bank charges, the 
Court is only able to give an abstract reply, which the court making the 
reference may often find unsatisfactory. 
The need for a precise knowledge of the factual circumstances was em-
phasized by the Court in the Irish Creamery case, in which the Court was 
asked, among other things, whether a reference to it should be made before 
or after the facts had been clarified.14 Although the Court stated that this 
was a matter for the national court to decide and that therefore a reference 
could be made at an early stage in the proceedings, it also pointed out the 
value of having the facts in the case clarified first so that the national court 
could be given an answer which was really helpful in the specific case. 
It follows inevitably from the nature of the judicial office that the spe-
cific circumstances which come to light in the proceedings are capable of 
influencing the decision of the Court to a considerable extent even if the 
final settlement of the case must then be left to the national court. If the 
Court of Justice is already able to see that a possible reply to the question 
referred to it will lead to a result which it feels to be unjust, it will seek ways 
of bringing about some other result. It is of course not possible to give 
specific examples, but it should be noted that the reply to the abstract ques-
tion framed by the court making the reference is not infrequently influ-
enced by the result which the Court believes to be correct in the case sub 
judice. 
It therefore follows that in the Court of Justice, too, the judge's 'judicial 
instinct" plays a role, since if the Court is to ensure that justice is done that 
instinct must produce an effect even in individual cases. Nevertheless that 
intuitive reaction must be controlled by rational criteria for decisionmak-
ing, which will be considered in due course. An individual case should not 
be resolved by laying down principles of broad scope which range beyond 
the general context of the case and produce unforeseeable effects. Yet the 
foregoing comments admit that parties are not ill-advised if they explain 
the specific circumstances underlying the question put by the court making 
the reference. 
The Court's adoption of an approach directed toward the specific facts 
of the case at bar is above all necessary because the Court may not overlook 
the effect of judgments drawn up in general terms on the multitude of con-
ceivable factual variations. The Court was not so reticent in the sixties and 
at the beginning of the seventies. In that period it established the well-
known general principles which set the trend for the future and from which 
it subsequently permitted exceptions where necessary in individual cases. 
Such an approach may have been appropriate in the Community's forma-
tive years and, with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that it did advance 
the Community to a considerable extent; one need only think of the great 
judgments delivered in 1963 and 1964. 15 Nevertheless, there were also 
13. Zochnerv. Bayerische VereinsbankAG (Case No. 172/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
2021 (Preliminary Ruling). 
14. Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Assn. v. Ireland (Nos. 36, 71/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 735 (Preliminary Ruling) (national charges on agricultural products of national origin). 
15. See, e.g., N.V. Algemene Transport v. Nederlandse Administratie der belastingen 
(Case No. 26/62), 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. I (Preliminary Ruling) (prohibition of customs 
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areas in which such general principles were ahead of developments and at 
first did not determine Community practice, for example in the field of 
external relations. 16 
However, in the course of the seventies the Court of Justice seems to 
have become increasingly cautious about laying down general principles 
and has concentrated to a greater extent on the problem to be solved in the 
individual case. In any event that is clearly the trend today. The reasons 
for this are open to various conjectures. On the one hand there is the in-
creasing complexity of the facts of cases, which makes it ever more difficult 
to foresee the effects of judgments .in the context of the obscure interaction 
of provisions of Community law and provisions of national law. On the 
other hand, the cause may lie in the changes in the composition of the 
Court, that is to say in the arrival of Judges from the common law tradition 
schooled in case law and inclined to a pragmatic approach and in the grad-
ual introduction of a new generation of Judges. Finally it would seem that 
the general lack of political direction also plays a part. The Court is no 
longer able to rely on a general unconditional will to integrate. Even in the 
other Community institutions there have been no great advances toward 
integration for a long time now; instead there has been merely the persistent 
policy of progressing by small painful steps. 
One good example of this trend is the case law relating to measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning 
of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. The Court of Justice originally laid down 
extraordinarily broad principles in the .Dassonvi/le Case in 1974. 17 Its 
judgment in the Cassis de .Dijon case in 1979 further developed these princi-
ples.18 However, it has largely gone unnoticed that the latter decision con-
tained considerable limitations on the principles which had originally been 
laid down. Consequently, the Court has subsequently developed a case-by-
case jurisprudence in which it weighs against each other in a pragmatic 
manner the interests worthy of protection.19 
Occasional departures from this general reticent trend, which, further-
more, will usually lead to conflicts, will have to be regarded as exceptions 
which prove the rule.20 
duties); Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary Rul-
ing) (nationalization); see also Stein, supra note 4. 
16. See, e.g., Commission of the Eur. Comm. v. Council of the Eur. Comm. (Case No. 
22/70), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263 (ERTA Agreement); Advisory Opinion 1/78, 1979 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871 (International Agreement on Natural Rubber). 
17. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville (Case No. 8/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837 
(Preliminary Ruling) ( certificate of authenticity for whisky). 
18. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
(Case No. 120/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649 (Preliminary Ruling). 
19. See generally Everling, Zur neueren EuGH-Rechtsprechung zum Wellbewerbsrecht, 17 
EuR 301 (1982); Barents, New Developments in Measures Having Equivalent Effect, 18 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 271 (1981); Moench, Der Schutz desfreien Warenverkehrs im Gemeinsamen 
Markt, 35 NJW 2689 (1982); Oliver, Measures of Equivalent Effect: A Reappraisal, 19 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 217 (1982). 
20. See Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Ac-
cijnzen (Case No. 15/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1409 (Preliminary Ruling) (value added 
tax on importation of second-hand goods); Advisory Opinion 1/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
2871 (International Agreement on Natural Rubber). 
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B. The Influence of the .D!fferent Legal Systems 
Even a case-by-case jurisprudence must follow general guidelines. It is 
not sufficient for every judgment to be based on previous judgments in 
comparable cases and to constitute a continuance of them. Individual deci• 
sions must also follow a general line of orientation. That line of orientation 
is searched initially by each Judge on the basis of the legal system with 
which he is familiar, but he must also take account of the principles of other 
legal systems. That is accomplished by the comparison of laws, a process 
which is used in the Court to a far greater extent than its expression in the 
judgments would indicate. The basic information is usually provided by 
the excellent documentation service of the Court or by the Commission. As 
a general rule, however, the studies relate to limited fields only, and such 
specific comparisons are not free from problems.21 It is well known that 
identical rules in the Member States are in practice often applied in differ-
ent ways and that, conversely, different rules often lead to comparable 
results. 
The various individual provisions governing specific matters are, how• 
ever, of less importance for the Court's case law than the different basic 
attitudes underlying the individual legal systems. The best examples of this 
are in administrative law. The attitude of a French judge proceeding from 
the principle of "legalite" is different from that of a German judge applying 
the "Rechtsstaatsprinzip," while the English position based on the "rule of 
law" is different yet again.22 
What is more important to the French judge and to those judges whose 
own law has been influenced to a considerable extent by French adminis• 
trative law is to reestablish the integrity of the legal system which has been 
violated, while the German judge's principal inquiry is whether subjective 
rights have been infringed. The common law judge, however, thinks less in 
terms of the supremacy of the State and its organs (concepts such as 
"Hoheitsakt" and "offentliche Gewalt" or "puissance publique"), and is 
more concerned that in the event of a dispute the administration and the 
citizen should be on an equal footing. Frequently these different theoretical 
bases do not constitute an obstacle to similar solutions in the individual 
case; moreover, the appropriate solution often emerges in the Court's delib-
erations from the specific circumstances of the case. 
Nevertheless, the different concepts sometimes have an effect in prac-
tice, as the law relating to civil servants demonstrates. In contrast to the 
German courts, the Court of Justice has from the outset and without hesita• 
tion entertained actions brought by unsuccessful candidates for promotion 
without even inviting the successful candidate to become a party' to the pro• 
21. On the problems relating to such a specific comparative approach, see M. RHEINSTEIN, 
ElNFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 32 (1974). On the use of comparative law at the 
Court of Justice, see Daig, Zu Rechtsvergleichung und Methodenlehre im Europilischen Gemein-
schqftsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 395 (1981). 
22. On this and the following passage, see EUROPAISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT IM WER· 
DEN (J. Schwarze ed. 1982); Everling, Elemente eines europilischen Verwaltungsrechts, 98 DVB! 
649 (1983) (citing other sources). For a comparison of the systems, see Jarass, Besonder/reiten 
des franzosischen Verwaltungsrechts im Vergleich, 34 DOV 813 (1981). MacCormick, J)er 
Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, 39 JZ 65 (1984), contrasts essential differences between the 
German and the British-American concepts. 
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ceedings although his legal position may be affected even many years after 
the promotion.23 In addition, the administrative authority in such cases 
shows little reluctance in readopting in a correct manner and with retroac-
tive effect the measure which has been annulled, thereby restoring the legal-
ity of the position. 24 
The different ways in which administrative discretion is reviewed are of 
particular importance. Those judges whose national legal systems are 
strongly influenced by French law tend to leave the exercise of discretion, 
its compatibility with general objectives, the appraisal of the established 
facts and their classification under indeterminate legal concepts, the inter-
pretation of the relevant concepts, and even the interpretation of the limits 
of the discretion largely to the administrative agency. They are unable to 
understand that, for example, the legality of a properly adopted measure 
restricting imports of apples from Chile is to be examined in the light of the 
principle of free trade under Article 110 of the EEC Treaty,25 as was re-
quested by German lawyers in the case in point, or that it is necessary to 
recognize a subjective right to a correct exercise of discretion. Conversely, 
the governmental act free from judicial control ("acte de gouvernement," 
"gerichtsfreier Hoheitsakt"), which is firmly excluded under German law 
following the experiences of dictatorship,26 is still discussed in France al-
though it would appear that it is a concept which is no longer applied to 
measures adopted by the administration. 
On the other hand, all the judges, from whatever legal system they may 
come, take seriously any indication of a breach of legal principles such as 
the principles of equality, legitimate expectation and proportionality, or the 
right to a fair hearing. Thus, for example, the ratio decidendi of the judg-
ment in the Cousin case,27 which concerns the country of origin of textile 
products, was not the alleged incorrect assessment of the decisive criterion 
under the relevant provisions, namely the "last substantial process or opera-
tion" performed in respect of a product, but the inequality of treatment 
between dyed cloth and yarn that could not be justified on any objective 
ground. Even if one takes the view, in conformity with what is probably a 
prevailing trend at the present time, that the German courts go too far, at 
least in some respects, in their review of the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion, it would still seem that according to the German understanding of 
the law stricter standards apply. 
A further example of the influence of the Member States' different legal 
approaches is the use in the French legal system or in systems strongly in-
23. See, e.g., Dautzenberg v. Court of Just. of the Eur. Comm. (Case No. 2/80), 1980 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3107 (promotion of officials). For a discussion of the German position, see 
J. REMMEL, DIE KONKURRENTENKLAGE IM BEAMTENRECHT (1981). 
24. In theDautzenberg case, (Case No. 2/80), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3107, the promo-
tion that was declared void was restored in a correct manner and with retroactive effect; how-
ever the "victorious" competitor was also promoted forthwith. 
25. See Firma Anton DUrbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen (Case No. 
112/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095 (Preliminary Ruling). 
26. On that problem, see K. DOEHRING, DAS STMTSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND 223-27, 374-78 (2d ed. 1980). 
27. Directeur des Douanes et des Droits indirects v. Cousin (Case No. 162/82), 1983 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1101 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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fluenced by French law of "moyens," or "submissions," a practice which 
may clearly be traced to the Roman law system of actions.28 To a German 
lawyer's way of thinking, what are homogeneous situations are, in a sense, 
"sliced" into separate sections and examined one by one in a manner which 
seems to him both formalistic and remote from real life. Thus, the German 
judge normally tries to condense the "moyens" into an appropriate context, 
whereas, conversely, a judge schooled in a legal system strongly influenced 
by French law attempts to come to grips with what he would regard as the 
amorphous contentions of German parties to proceedings by dividing them 
into "moyens." Illustrations of the different approaches may be found by 
reading judgments such as those in the Nungesser, GVL, or Klockner cases 
on the one hand29 and the judgments concerning the French checks on 
wine imports and the seat of the European Parliament on the other hand,30 
in which the initial draft judgments were prepared by Judge-Rapporteurs 
from different legal systems. 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the Judges' understanding of the 
law is also influenced by the different constitutions of the Member States. 
A judge who comes from a Member State having a federal form is more 
prepared to tolerate different provisions in the individual Member States 
because he is used to that in his home country, while "federal" Europe is 
often regarded erroneously in the other Member States as unitary. Judges 
from Member States that have a constitutional court and whose administra-
tive courts have a broad jurisdiction to try issues by virtue of "general 
clauses" will be less inhibited in subjecting the political institutions of the 
Community and the legislation and individual measures adopted by them 
to judicial review than those from other Member States. 
In the last analysis such differences are frequently based on different 
concepts of State and nation which have evolved in the course of history. 
C. Substantive Guidelines for .Decisionmaking 
From these elements, that is to say from the facts of the specific case, 
even though they are often presented in an abstract manner, and from the 
understanding of the law which has developed differently in the various 
Member States and which is represented by strong individual personalities, 
the College of Judges forms its opinion on the problem to be resolved in the 
case at bar. This is done by mutual discussion and influence, a process that 
requires a high degree of understanding of the basic tenets of other legal 
28. See the wording of the first paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, which con-
cerns actions "on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural re-
quirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of powers." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173. For a discussion of the problem, see B. 
BORNER, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER HOHEN BEHORDE 142-46 (1965). 
29. Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH v. Commission of the 
Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 7/82), 1983 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 483 (performers' rights); Nun-
gesser KG v. Co=ission of the Eur. Co=. (Case No. 258/78), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
2015 (seeds); Kltlckner-Werke AG v. Commission of the Eur. Comm. (Case No. 119/81), 1982 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2627 (steel production quotas). 
30. Commission of the Eur. Comm. v. French Republic (Case No. 42/82), 1983 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 1013 (wine imports); Luxembourg v. European Parliament (Case No. 230/81), 1983 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 255 (seat and working place of the Parliament). 
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systems and that will lead to a successful outcome only if all sides possess a 
willingness to arrive at common conclusions. 
The substantive basis for working out a specific decision resting on a 
common understanding of the law must be the texts of the Treaties and the 
objectives of the Community which underlie them, but serious difficulties 
arise in precisely this context. It is common to refer to "teleological" inter-
pretation, 31 and that presents relatively few problems if it is understood as 
meaning the purpose-oriented application of technical provisions. How-
ever, the word means more than this; the Greek term "telos" in this context 
signifies the ultimate objective and the deeper purpose of the entire process 
of European integration. But what is the "telos" of the Community today? 
Is it still that of the founders, if even they were agreed in that respect?32 
At a time when, although there is much talk of the European Union and 
the necessity for concerted action, national needs still determine practices of 
the Community to a large extent, the Court of Justice is given little guid-
ance by the political institutions of the Community. On the contrary, some 
problems that the politicians are unable to solve may even be shifted onto 
the Court. 33 
In such circumstances the Court of Justice can scarcely fall back on gen-
eral objectives. Instead it must draw guidance from the specific tasks de-
fined in the Treaty and the results, which must be pursued and expanded 
upon, hitherto achieved on the basis of those tasks. This involves primarily 
securing the Common Market by applying the prohibition of discrimination 
and restrictions, by guaranteeing the conditions of competition, by ensuring 
a common position toward other countries and by protecting persons af-
fected by unlawful acts. The Common Market constitutes the starting point 
for the entire integration process and all attempts at more far-reaching eco-
nomic and political progress stem from it. Running like a red thread 
through the whole of the Court's case law is the idea that this core of the 
Community must remain sacrosanct. 
This endeavor of the Court to secure the Common Market, however, 
produces inevitable conflicts and contradictions with the powers of the 
Member States which are responsible for economic policy in general insofar 
as there are no Community rules in the individual instance. Particularly 
well known are the conflicts arising from the rules governing the manufac-
ture and marketing of products that have still not been harmonized, a situa-
tion which the decision in the Cassis de Dijon case was designed to meet.34 
In such instances, the Court of Justice strives to balance the fundamental 
requirement of securing the Common Market with the legitimate need of 
Member States to adopt rules in the public interest. In so doing, the Court 
31. See A. BREDIMAS, supra note 10, at 70-105. 
32. Doubts whether they were agreed would seem to be justified. See the detailed examina-
tion of discussions in the Member States on the purpose, subject matter, and methods of inte-
gration at the time of the Treaty negotiations in H.J. KOSTERS, DIE GRUNDUNG DER 
EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1982). 
33. See, e.g., Luxembourg v. European Parliament (Case No. 230/81), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 255 (seat and working place of the Parliament). 
34. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung filr Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
(Case No. 120/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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remains sensitive to modem developments such as the protection of the en-
vironment or the protection of consumers, as recent decisions have 
demonstrated. 35 
This balancing process based on specific circumstances is generally 
characteristic of the Court's case law, especially insofar as the Member 
States are affected by it. The Court cannot ignore that in the final analysis 
the Member States sustain the Community as its founders and exercise de-
cisive responsibility through the Council; it must also consider that they 
independently discharge functions of their own for the common good and 
in order to secure their national existence. On the other hand, however, the 
Member States are incorporated into the Community and are subject to 
Community law and must accept that restrictions are placed on them by the 
case law, including, where appropriate, decisions in Treaty-infringement 
cases. In that respect, too, the Court proceeds in a manner that is prag-
matic, balanced and unaffected by ideology.36 
The case method aids such an approach. The Court builds upon earlier 
judgments, feels its way to the next case and thus gradually works out the 
guidelines to which it can refer for further orientation. Of course this can 
sometimes lead to an impasse or to inconsistencies, such as in the decisions 
on fees for veterinary health inspections on the occasion of importation.37 
And yet there is no other way. 
The Court's pragmatic approach is demonstrated with particular clarity 
by the Nungesser judgment on seeds.38 The Court's decision in that case 
related solely to the protection of plant variety rights and was based on the 
specific characteristics of those rights. The decision did not relate, as some 
observers have suggested, in disregard of express contrary statements in the 
judgment, to rights deriving from licensing agreements in general. It may 
be that, as is frequently claimed, the criteria developed by the Court would 
also apply in the same way to patent-licensing agreements.39 If that were 
the conclusion of academic criticism of the Nungesser judgment and were 
knowledgeably discussed before the Court in a subsequent case, then the 
Court could take the next step in the development of general principles in 
full knowledge of the problems and consequences. Such a future decision 
would then have the prospect of finding general acceptance because its 
foundations would have been laid in public debate. 
35. See Public Prosecutor v. Sandoz B.V. (Case No. 174/82), 1984 COMMON MKT. REP, 
(CCH) ~ 14,006 (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. July 14, 1983) (addition of vitamins to food), digested i11 
1983 ECJR 86; notes 17, 19 supra. 
36. See note 5 supra. 
37. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Leonelli (Case No. 88/82), 1983 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 1061 (Preliminary Ruling). But an impasse or inconsistency may prompt the Court 
to search for a new orientation. See, for example, the recent judgment concerning fees for 
health inspections, I.F.G. Intercontinentale Fleischhandelsgessellschaft v. Freistat Bayem 
(Case No. 1/83) (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Jan. 31, 1984, not yet published) (Preliminary Ruling), 
digested in 1984 ECJR 15. 
38. L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission of the Eur. Comm. (Case No. 258/78), 1982 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015. 
39. See F. Koenigs, DER BETRlEB 1811 (1982); Piettl.e,Anmerkung zu L.C. Nungesser KG 
v. Kommission, 1982 GRUR INT. 537; Reinhardt,Anmerkung, 28 RIW/AWD 825 (1982); van 
Bael, Reflexions sur /'Arre/ "Semences de Mals'~· des Semences d'Espoir?, 19 CAH. DR. EUR. 
176 (1983); Verloop, Maize Seed Judgment, 11 INTL. Bus. LAW. 231 (1983). 
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The case law method thus involves simultaneous assessment of the indi-
vidual case and efforts toward the further development of Community law 
in general terms. The day-to-day treatment of individual cases gradually 
develops, on the basis of the legal systems existing in the Community, into a 
common understanding of the law that will sustain the legal order of the 
Community. This common understanding of the law is gradually formed 
in the course of the procedure in each individual case, as described above, 
by the mutual influence of the judges who represent and explain the multi-
tude of values and legal views. And although that procedure is also fre-
quently burdensome because it is lengthy and cumbersome, it nonetheless 
provides the opportunity for integrative decisionmaking on a basis which 
encompasses all the Member States. 
Ill. CONCLUSIONS FOR AN APPRAISAL OF THE CASE LAW 
The foregoing references to the problems and peculiarities of the 
Court's decisionmaking should have made it clear that this operation must 
be seen as a process. A proper assessment and judgment of the Court's 
decisions can only be made if they are viewed as the culmination of such a 
process in the sense of an integrative procedure. A few further comments in 
that respect follow by way of summary. 
A. The .Decisionmaking of the Court as a Process 
The judgments of the Court of Justice are not pronouncements by a 
monolithic institution proclaiming, on the basis of preconceived principles 
and fixed opinions, its words of wisdom which are supposed to have the 
highest claim to ultimate validity. Instead, as has been shown, the judg-
ments are formed in the course of an extremely complicated process which 
varies from case to case and in which eleven persons of very different ori-
gins and with different concepts of values and objectives must, under diffi-
cult circumstances, in the context of a concrete setting, come to a conclusion 
accepted by all or at least by a sufficiently large majority. 
Many such difficulties are inevitably present in every collegiate court 
and in particular in the Bundesverfassungsgericht with its Senates of eight 
members coming from different camps. But the communication necessary 
to reach a consensus is stretched to its limits by the Court of Justice's even 
higher number of Judges and particularly by the Judges' different nationali-
ties, history, legal traditions and concepts of the State. The basic consensus 
that unites the members of a national court, notwithstanding all differences 
of opinion on details, exists in the Court of Justice only in the form of a 
strong awareness of a common responsibility for fulfilling the task assigned 
to it. 
Consequently, when the Court is in the process of reaching a decision it 
engages in a work of construction which, in a certain sense, reflects the en-
tire process of European integration in which it is embedded. It therefore 
cannot work in isolation; the Members of the Court need to be supported 
by the public in their respective countries, by legal writers, by references 
from national courts and by the participation of national authorities in pro-
ceedings. Only if all legal systems represented in the Community contrib-
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ute fully to the making of the Court's decisions is it able properly to fulfill 
its task of developing a genuine Community legal order. 
B. The Court's Judgments as the Results of the .Decisionmaking Process 
The variety of opinions that must be merged in the process whereby the 
Court makes its decisions necessarily finds expression in the judgments. 
The operative part of the judgments, that is to say the actual result of the 
proceedings, reflects this variety to some extent. But it is usually less diffi-
cult to come to agreement on the result than on the reasoning which there-
fore often reflects more controversies and compromises. In the course of 
deliberations there is frequently particular dispute over questions that leave 
no trace in the reasoning of the judgment. As a general rule such questions 
are not overlooked, as some critics think, but reaching agreement on them 
is so difficult that the Court prefers not to mention them. 
The Court of Justice is constantly impressed to find what wide-reaching 
intentions and ideas are often read into its decisions. It is tempting to draw 
a comparison with the work of the modern artist which is given some deep 
meaning, often to the artist's surprise, in the criticism of experts and feature 
writers. The judgments are certainly not works of art, but they are the 
products of a creative intellectual process. As intellectual creations they 
become detached from their creators on publication and acquire indepen-
dent significance in the process of integration; in fact, they become in-
dependent of and often go beyond what the authors may have thought 
when arriving at and formulating their decisions. 
Courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions. The 
inherent power of persuasion of their judgments entitles courts to expect 
acceptance by those affected by the decisions.40 Reliance on the power of 
persuasion is particularly important in a system such as the Community in 
which the means for enforcing judgments are limited and in which compli-
ance with them ultimately depends on the recognition by all concerned that 
the common interest requires respect for the Community legal order. Nev-
ertheless, it is difficult to determine the criterion against which the quality 
of the case law is to be measured. 
With regard to constitutional courts an American view that the correct-
ness of the result should be the sole criterion has lately been opposed by a 
German view. The former president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
recently explained that it must seek acceptance of its decisions primarily in 
the persuasive power of its reasoning.41 
The difficulties involved in the process of arriving at its decisions limit 
the extent to which the Court of Justice can develop truly coherent and 
convincing reasoning. Although the Court has for some time endeavored to 
provide more detailed and persuasive reasoning than it formerly did, so 
that the frequently raised complaint concerning the laconic brevity of its 
decisions would now appear to be out of date, nevertheless its efforts in that 
40. See Benda, Zur gesel!schafllichen Akzeptonz verwoltungs- und ve,jossungsgerichtlicher 
Entscheidungen, 36 D6V 305 (1983). 
41. Benda, supra note 40, at 307. 
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direction are confined within narrow limits by virtue of the nature of its 
decisionmaking process. 
The Court of Justice therefore creates its own legitimacy primarily by 
the internal logic and consistency of the actual results expressed in its judg-
ments and by the significance of those results for the development of the 
Community legal order and the continuation of the process of integration. 
They acquire their own pattern only in the perspective of a whole series of 
judgments on given problems, in which it gradually becomes clear what the 
Court of Justice regards as the criteria ''justi atque injusti" in the 
Community. 
C. The Role of the Court of Justice in Protecting Individual Rights and as 
a Constitutional Institution 
A Judge of the Court of Justice must naturally leave to others the ap-
praisal of the question whether and to what extent the Court fulfills in its 
judgments, arrived at in the manner described above, its role as a constitu-
tional court and as a court providing protection of individual rights. How-
ever, by way of conclusion, reference must also be made to certain factors 
that are important to the Court's conception of its own role. 
From the point of view of its role both as a constitutional court and as a 
court providing protection of individual rights, the essential factor is the 
Court's relationship with other Community institutions and with the Mem-
ber States. 
When an action is brought before the Court l?Y a business firm or by an 
individual against a decision adopted by a Community institution or, indi-
rectly, by means of a reference from a national court for a preliminary rul-
ing against a decision by a national authority giving effect to Community 
law, the Court accords the protection of the law in the same way as national 
courts in comparable cases by reviewing the specific measure. However, 
there is a major difference between those courts and the Court of Justice; 
the latter is not able to rely on a fully developed legal order, but must, 
insofar as it does not refer to national law, itself first develop, in the manner 
described, the principles and criteria of Community law against which it 
will appraise the measure in question. 
Insofar as the Court thereby creates judge-made law, its function of pro-
tecting individual rights takes on, at the same time, a constitutional aspect 
because the law concerns an area that has been assigned to the legislative 
institutions of the Community. Afortiori, the relationship to those institu-
tions becomes material when the Court examines the legality of provisions 
adopted by Community institutions and thereby extends Community law 
by means of general principles oflaw. Yet the Court is not thereby putting 
itself in the position of the Community legislature; it does not stray from 
the sphere of judicial activity, which is the judgment of specific cases ac-
cording to rules that it has previously found to constitute the law in force, 
and therefore not in the intention of furtherance of a specific policy. The 
power of the Community legislature to legislate remains unimpaired and it 
may in certain circumstances even, insofar as no Treaty provisions or gen-
eral principles of law are involved, correct the consequences of the Court's 
jurisprudence. 
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Thus, the function of the Court of Justice as a constitutional court is 
primarily to interpret and develop the Community legal order. In doing 
this the Court does not usurp the position of the political institutions but it 
participates, as a judicial institution, in the creation of a constitution which 
is in a constant state of evolution in a pluralistic community. In an incom-
pletely constituted system like the Community, to use the words of one 
commentator, "the constitution . . . is made by the open society of those, 
all those, who interpret it. In the European Community, creation of a con-
stitution is being partly happened by means of mere interpretation."42 The 
supreme interpreter is the Court of Justice; and its importance for the pro-
grams of European integration could hardly be expressed more clearly. 
42. H!iberle, Verfassungsinterpretation und Verfassungsgehung, 9 ZFSR I (1978). It is not 
possible to consider in the present context the problems raised by H!iberle's conception of the 
"openness of the constitution"; on that, see Kaiser, Einige Umrisse des deutschen Staatsdenkens 
seit Weimar, 108 AoR 5 (1983). It would, however, appear to be instructive for the purpose of 
characterizing the development of the Community, although it must be added that precisely in 
the present context it is not a "State" constitution that is being discussed. 
